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Introduction 
 
Terrorist attacks are unfortunately not a new phenomenon in the 21st century. With the attacks 
on 9/11, Paris, Brussels and many more, worries and fears of further attacks are a relevant 
subject of debate. Behind the scenes however, various governments, organizations and 
agencies are focussing their efforts on ways to stop these events from occurring. International 
police cooperation stresses the importance for nations to come together in fighting these 
forms of international crimes. By combining police forces across states effectiveness, speed 
and sharing of information is enhanced (Deflem & Maybin, 2005).  
Interpol is one of the organizations that concerns itself with fighting international 
crime. By bringing together now over 190 countries, the organization aims to enhance 
cooperation across state borders. Their mission: “Preventing and fighting crime through 
enhanced cooperation and innovation on police and security matters” includes three main 
programmes, with one that focusses primarily on counterterrorism (Interpol, n.d.). However, 
this organization originally does not profile itself as a party which gets involved in political 
and controversial crimes. The reason Interpol has been able to evolve itself as primary 
international organization (IO) in the field of policing, is its non-political stance. The 
organization is built upon the premises that it would not get involved in political crimes to 
safeguard the political sovereignty of states (Mallika, 2007). The organization’s mandate 
clearly states, “it is strictly forbidden for the organisation to intervene in activities of a 
political, military, religious or racial character” (Interpol Constitution, Article 3). A clear 
demonstration of this is their refusal to provide information on the terrorist suspects of the 
Munich terrorist attack during the 1972 Olympic Games. Their response references to the 
prohibition of political interference “terrorism was clearly political and thus outside their 
original mandate” (Barnett & Coleman, 2005, p.610). However, in a world where the threat of 
terrorist attacks has a great impact on the international community, they have come to profile 
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themselves as the world’s largest international police organization, capable of countering 
terrorism, and including such crimes as a main aim in their operations. This IO has thus 
changed its position on counterterrorism and found a way to start fighting a very political and 
religious battle against this phenomenon. This research aims to explore the change this IO has 
gone through concerning the incorporation of counterterrorism in their practices. 
RQ: How can the transition of Interpol from a ‘non-political’ IO into a leading 
organization in counterterrorism be explained? 
By looking at the organization’s history, this research will follow the process that led the 
organization from refusal of working on counterterrorism projects to this becoming one of 
their main concerns. By identifying key periods in their history, this research aims to identify 
how the organization has been able to change and what motivated them to do so. 
It is important to address this issue to understand how Interpol’s practices nowadays 
are legitimized in the context of international police cooperation. International police 
cooperation is an interesting phenomenon in the field of IO research. Where most scholars 
stress the centrality of states in IO research (Barnett & Coleman, 2005), the notion of a 
‘supranational’ police force that exerts power in different countries clashes directly with the 
notion of state sovereignty and police autonomy (Deflem, 2007, p.18). It is thus highly 
important for IOs such as Interpol to appear as an independent and neutral player in the 
international field. 
Apart from its social relevance, this research also tackles a controversial factor in IO 
research. The concept of interorganizational change is one that scholars have yet to get a clear 
grip on. This research aims to take a closer look at the relationship between autonomy of IOs 
and the sovereignty of states. By looking at this case, which balances the IO’s own challenges 
expanding into the field of counterterrorism whilst respecting the sovereignty of its members, 
it provides an interesting platform to explore views and factors from within IOs that can drive 
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change (Chwieroth, 2008). Looking at rationalist, institutionalist and constructivist theories 
on indicators of change, the response of Interpol to terrorism will be examined. Since Interpol 
deliberately and consciously incorporated practices that deviated from one of its fundamental 
articles and jeopardizes its position in the international field, this interorganizational change is 
noticeable. The processes leading up to this decision might explain ways in which other IOs 
are able to exert autonomy and break away from their original, perhaps constraining, aims. 
Through an in-depth analysis of the processes that led to the incorporation of counterterrorism 
practices in the mission of Interpol, this research does not only aim to examine the change this 
organisation has gone through but also provide an explanation and validation for their 
decision to go against their original mandate. 
This research will first provide a theoretical framework on IO research and IO change 
in relation to international police cooperation, to lay out the basis for examining Interpol’s 
alterations. By using the concept of critical junctures, this research will apply a framework to 
identify the context under which the organization was able to go against the core principle of 
non-political interference and set course on a path divergent of their original mandate. By 
locating factors throughout history attributed to this change, the underlying causes will be 
revealed. The findings show that after the attacks in Munich, member states called for 
increasing cooperation, loosening the constraints of the organization’s respect for state 
sovereignty. Because of this Interpol was able to reinterpret their Article3 opening up 
possibilities to expand their counterterrorism efforts, setting them on a path-dependent course.  
 
Literature Review 
This research aims to examine how an IO such as Interpol was able to change its stance on 
counterterrorism which was first clearly defined as a procedure that goes against the apolitical 
nature of the practices in the organization. The next section will explore existing literature on 
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IOs and build on different theories of organizational change to illustrate how organizations 
can be motivated to change their course of action. By creating a framework inspired by the 
concept of critical junctures, this research will argue that it was a critical period in Interpol’s 
history that allowed for the organization to make alternative decisions and alter their path, 
causing this interorganizational change.  
 
International Organizations Research 
IO research focusses primarily on the formation of international organizations, their 
autonomy, their relation to states, or place in the international system (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; 
Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Mearsheimer, 1994). However, there is no consensus on why or 
how IOs change and what elements drive them to do so.  To see where processes of change of 
IOs come from, one must first acknowledge the place they have in the international system. 
IO scholars have identified various perspectives on who or what controls the course of action 
of IOs. One can find a distinction between the state as primary actor, with IOs serving as a 
reflection of the world power balance (Mearsheimer, 1994) and IOs as a key actor themselves, 
responding to the fluctuating structures of the organization itself (Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004). IO scholars arguing from a realist perspective give no autonomy to IOs in the 
international system. These organizations only reflect the self-interest of states trying to reach 
their goals in a power-grabbing world. In this logic IOs only change because they are used as 
tools for states to safely calculate and increase their share of world power (Mearsheimer, 
1994). On the contrary, other approaches in IO research highlight explicitly the autonomy of 
IOs and their effect on change. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue from a constructivist 
perspective and state that if IOs are just constructs of rules and norms through which states 
behave and have no autonomy or agency, then they cannot prove to act in a meaningful way. 
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They argue that by attributing some form of autonomy and power to IOs, their behaviour, and 
especially changes in their behaviour, can be better explained.  
In line with this research, it is of the essence to take an adaptive view on the relations 
between states and IOs instead of just seeing them as either mere tools or as complex 
bureaucratic processes. Sociologist Mathew Deflem has looked into this relationship in the 
field of international police cooperation. He argues from a sociological perspective and builds 
on Max Weber’s bureaucratization theory to explain how international police cooperation can 
be made possible. According to this bureaucratization theory, international police 
organizations have only become possible when primarily detached from the politics and 
power of states. It is when they function autonomously as expert bureaucracies that 
cooperation across state borders can exist. Only when motivation is encouraged by 
professional interest instead of political calculation can the fight against international crime be 
efficient (Deflem, 2000). In addition, Bossard (1988) argues that the only way to fight 
criminality on a world-wide scale is through international cooperation, but with respect for 
every nation’s sovereignty. To effectively foster cooperation across borders, an organization 
must assure its members that there are no signs of a political agenda that can harm the 
international power dynamics. Because of Interpol’s unique position in this field, it is 
important to considering these relations between states and organizations in this research. 
Because of their expertise in the field of international police cooperation, they can only be 
successful as a fully autonomous organization that stays clear from any political agenda that 
can influence the effectiveness of their activities.  
 
Organizational Change 
 Concerning organizational change, scholars have argued in favour of exogenous and 
endogenous sources. A theory that concerns itself with explaining organizational behaviour 
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and the alteration thereof is that of path dependency. Scholars using path dependent 
arguments often trace history and state that heightened moments of fluidity and change are 
followed by longer periods of stable reproduction (Soifer, 2012; Capoccia, 2015; Schreyogg 
& Sydow, 2011). In this line of thought, what happens at an early point in history will have an 
impact on the possibilities of actions for an organization that will eventually lead to set, 
altered course of action (Pierson, 2000; Schreyogg & Sydow, 2011). A part of this theory, 
rooted in historical institutionalism, is the concept of critical junctures. This is often seen as 
the phase of path dependency where uncertainty creates room for alternative decision which 
will eventually set an organization on a different persistent path (Capoccia, 2015). Although 
this theory places much emphasis on exogenous shock to trigger change and cause altering 
paths, it is useful in explaining deviant choices with organizations such as Interpol and 
explain their sudden change of action. The concept of critical junctures is useful for this 
research since it is able to provide tools for analysing the origins of organizational change 
within Interpol and explain the altering and permanent outcomes (Cappocia, 2015). 
Additionally, it stresses the dynamics during key decision points, as well as the force behind 
choices at times where organizations have the potential to change and alter their course of 
action (Calder & Ye, 2004). 
Mahoney (2002) highlights the role of IOs themselves as part of their own change. He 
states that most literature concerning organizational change place too much emphasis on 
exogenous shocks and overlook shifts that are initiated by endogenous properties of these 
organizations. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue that the cause of change within IOs lies 
within the dynamic elements of their basic properties. They build on institutionalist theories 
and look closely at what aspects of institutions permit change. They argue that when rule 
interpretation and enforcement become problematic, this opens possibilities for change to 
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occur. They mention several indicators of gradual change that take into account political and 
institutional context to explain how change can occur.  
This research will look both at the exogenous shocks as well as endogenous properties 
of the organization to explain the change made within Interpol by focussing on a framework 
of critical junctures. It is important to note that an approach of critical junctures in this 
research will not ignore the pre-existing institutional structure of the organization. The basic 
properties of an organization are important factors that play a decisive role in the decision-
making process during a time of critical juncture where these structural constraints are 
loosened (Calder & Ye, 2004). This research will, therefore, also take into account those 
features of the organization that have aided the decisions to change such as the interpretation 
of Article 3, which safeguards the organization’s unpolitical nature.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
To answer how Interpol has changed from an IO based on non-political interference into one 
of the leading organizations in counterterrorism, this research will argue that a period of 
critical juncture loosened up the organization’s constraints and opened up more choices in 
their decision-making process. This research hypothesizes that after crises caused by terrorist 
activities, Interpol’s role in international police cooperation widens as the need for their 
interference by member states increases. Their non-political nature and respect for state 
sovereignty is then open to revaluation and their choices to get involved in counterterrorism 
expand. It is a combination of these new options plus the favourable features of the 
organization’s ambiguous Constitution that aided the change in their course of action towards 
counterterrorism.  
A crucial element of this argument is the concept of critical junctures. Critical 
junctures are often defined as “periods of significant change, which typically occur in distinct 
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ways, and which are hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (Collier & Collier, 2002, 
p.29). This research identifies with the definition posed by Capoccia and Keleman (2007) 
defining critical junctures as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a 
substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” 
(p.348). Critical junctures then mainly represent situations in which the influences and 
constraints on political actions are loosened during a brief time period. This leads to the 
expansion of available options open for decision and the consequences to be more effective 
(Cappocia & Keleman, 2007). This definition of the concept is able to explain the alternative 
options gained after the crisis situation, the alteration of Interpol’s stance on terrorism, as well 
as the increased impact of this decision for the organization’s future.  
To argue for potential critical junctures in this case, and their effects on the decisions 
made by Interpol concerning counterterrorism, the elements of this concept must be analysed. 
Collier and Collier (2002) pose basic building blocks of critical junctures necessary for using 
their framework. Antecedent conditions or the base line explain the initial structural 
conditions prior to the critical juncture. Against these basic properties the critical juncture and 
its outcomes will be assessed (Collier & Collier). The Cleavage or permissive conditions 
emerge out of the antecedent conditions and represent an event or chain of events that trigger 
a period of critical juncture (Collier & Collier, 2002; Soifer, 2012). In the presence of 
permissive conditions, productive conditions produce the outcome which will be reproduces. 
Legacies of the critical juncture are the outcomes that through mechanisms of reproduction 
become persistent over time. This is what make the junction critical, meaning that the change 
that occurred in this specific point in history sticks (Soifer, 2012). Lastly, alternative 
explanations represent rival explanations with constant causes. These test possible decisions 
without the presence of a period of critical juncture to assess its impact.   
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By using these tools, this research will argue that the standard conditions in which 
Interpol has to remain non-political to safeguard their members’ sovereignty have been 
loosened during a period of critical juncture making them able to get involved in 
counterterrorism practices and prove that, under alternative circumstances, the expansion of 
their activities into counterterrorism could not have been adopted. 
The second part of the argument poses that the basic structural properties of Interpol 
have aided the change in being able to get involved in counterterrorism practices. These basic 
properties that aid change find their basis in Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) gradual change 
theory. They state that an important factor in gradual change is institutional ambiguity and 
malleability. They argue that change occurs when problems of rule interpretation opens up the 
possibility for these to be altered or implemented in new ways. This research expects the 
interpretation of Interpol’s Article 3, which states “It is strictly forbidden for the Organization 
to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character” 
(Interpol Constitution, Article 3) has aided the choice to get involved in counterterrorism 
practices and opened up more possibilities in time to expand their activities. The lacking 
classification of actual cases that fall under these ‘characteristics’ allows for a different 
approach to each case. The interpretation of this rule by Interpol itself will come to light 
during the analysis, showing that its ambiguity played a big part in aiding the change the 
organization has gone through. 
Overall, Interpol has been confronted with problems concerning their unpolitical 
nature during numerous events. This research, therefore, believes that it is possible for a 
period of critical juncture to have occurred in the history of Interpol that has led them to 
alternative decision on their future course of action. Since this research acknowledges the 
autonomy contributed to the organization itself as product of their position in the international 
cooperation field, the relationship between the Interpol and its members states will play a 
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crucial role as well as the processes playing out within the organization. This research will 
then argue that it was a combination of the expanded choices created by a critical juncture 
plus the interpretation of Article 3 found in the organization Constitution that caused and 
aided this change. 
 
Method 
This research examining the change from within Interpol to include counterterrorism efforts 
in their practices will look at the organization’s history to assess how this path-altering choice 
has been able to be made. By using the qualitative research method of a case study of marked 
moments that gradually build up to the change of Interpol’s inclusion of counterterrorism 
practices, this research aims to identify how the organization changed and what the attributing 
factors were that permitted and initiated this transformation. The case study will aim to apply 
a framework of critical junctures to find the key point in history that has expanded the 
organization’s choices and allowed them to take a course-altering path. By using a framework 
of critical junctures, this research will aim to explain how Interpol has been able to deviate 
from their non-political nature and illustrate how this decision could have been made, plus 
how it has changed the priorities of this organization in the long run.  
 
Case selection 
Interpol’s change to diverge from its a-political nature is defined in Article 3 of their 
Constitution: “It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or 
activities of a political, military, religious or racial character” (Interpol Constitution, Article 
3). The alterations to this rule pose an interesting case to examine considering organizational 
change. The conscious decision to gradually include cases on terrorism in their activities over 
time shows the complicated processes this organization is confronted with and how these 
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have called for a change of course. The change of incorporation of counterterrorism practices 
in the activities performed by Interpol can be traced to certain changes throughout time that 
gradually led up to this IO being a leading agency in counterterrorism. Deflem and Maybin 
(2005) have examined Interpol’s counterterrorism measures leading up and in response to 
9/11. The outlined events by these researchers map out a period from the early 1970s with the 
refusal of getting involved in the investigation of the terrorist attack at the Olympic Games in 
Munich, to prioritizing terrorism as a main aim of the organization’s activities as well as 
setting up a special division focussed on counterterrorism efforts after 9/11. This case study 
will focus on this period in which change has led to transformations or additions in the tasks 
performed by Interpol. The focus will lie on the resolutions passed in this period, the 
decisions made during General Assembly meetings, structural changes and expansion of 
activities, and adjustments concerning the interpretation of Article 3 in Interpol’s 
Constitution.  
 
Applying a Framework of Critical Junctures 
For a critical juncture to be assessed in this research, it is important to take all 
necessary steps to locate all influential factors preceding and following this period. Capoccia 
(2015) and Collier and Collier (2002) have all set up conditions to examine critical junctures 
through history. First, the unit of analysis and the antecedent conditions must be defined, 
showing the normal conditions under which, the decisions could otherwise not have been 
made. Secondly, hypothesized critical junctures must be identified. Critical junctures are often 
a result of crises or shocks - for Interpol this research focusses on those points in history that 
have impacted and challenged the organization, such as confrontations during terrorist 
attacks. To select actual critical junctures that have impacted the organization, one must test 
structural effects that could lead to only one available choice during a critical period or that 
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the choice made does not have a lasting effect. Once a critical juncture has been identified, it 
must ‘read history forward’ (Cappocia, 2015, p30). This means reconstructing the process and 
identifying the main decision-makers as well as the environment in which the decision was 
made. By looking at which forces were at play as well as what other options could have been 
taken, the impact of the critical juncture can be shown. Since a critical juncture is only critical 
if it opens up the organization to choices that could not have been made under normal 
circumstances and would not have had a lasting effect, this reconstruction is crucial. Lastly, 
the legacy of the critical juncture must be shown to explain the divergent path leading of the 
decisions made in this period (Capoccia, 2015; Collier & Collier, 2002). The key to using this 
framework for analysis of the inclusion of counterterrorism practices by Interpol and to see 
how this change could have occurred lies in the identification of legacies that have come from 
the critical junctures. By taking the above-mentioned steps, the argument that constraints on 
Interpol by its non-political nature have been loosened during a period of critical juncture can 
be analysed and assessed.  
 
Data 
The data will consist of primary sources from Interpol itself, such as articles from the 
Constitution, official passed resolutions, agreements and treaties, transcripts or records of 
General Assemblies, but also articles written about the organization from outside experts. 
Apart from documentation from the organization itself, data will also consist of secondary 
sources from scholarly authors that have written about the practices and changes within 
Interpol, as well as articles reflecting their reputation in the outside world. By gathering and 
analysing this data, this research hopes to sketch a clear picture of how Interpol has changed 
its position on terrorism and was able to alter its aims to go against its fundamental principles. 
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Analysis 
Antecedent conditions 
When analysing Interpol’s change from an IO based on the principles of neutrality and non-
political involvement to an international leading agency in counterterrorism, it is important to 
look at the foundation on which the organization is built as well as its history concerning the 
controversy on political cases. Since this research argues in line with the concept of critical 
junctures and explains that this change occurred as a result of expanding possibilities in the 
decision-making process, it is important to first outline the standard conditions under which 
Interpol functioned before entering a period of critical juncture to compare the outcome. The 
next section will outline the origins of the organization, the foundation of its non-political 
character and modes of decision-making.  
 
Case History: Origins of Interpol 
Interpol can be seen as the world’s main international policing organization that fosters 
cooperation with a global membership (Ling, 2010). The origin of this global cooperation 
system can be traced back to the First Congress of Criminal Police held in Monaco in 1914, 
where the need and wish for a central documentation involving international crime was 
defined. However, the wish for this establishment of cross-border police cooperation was 
interrupted by the events of World War 1. In 1923, the basis of Interpol was founded during 
the second Congress of Criminal Police in Vienna. The International Commission of Criminal 
Police, which is the original forefather of the organization that would eventually turn into 
Interpol, came into existence (Bossard, 1988). The Commission developed from a unique 
institution with a constitution written by a random group of police officials, without 
recognition or diplomatic signatures from member states, to the first structured international 
police cooperation organization with a central criminal data bank. These efforts, however, 
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were set back with the outbreak of yet another war, the Second World War. Because of the 
divide of allegiance and the subtle replacement of staff with Nazi officials, the ICPC 
(Interpol) was deemed non-functioning at the time (Bresler, 1992). After the war, a third 
attempt was now made to re-establish the necessarily called for police cooperation. The 
headquarters of the organization moved to France and as of 1956 a new constitution 
restructured the International Criminal Police Organization -Interpol into existence (Bossard, 
1988). The now Secretary-General of the organization Jean Nepoté was forced to completely 
rebuilt and re-establish the collection of criminal files, with one important change, there was 
no mention of the criminal’s religion (Bresler, 1992). This time the organization increased its 
credibility by having gained consultative status of a non-governmental organization by the 
UN and constructing a new constitution that acts in line with the goals of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Yapsan, 2012; Stalcup,2013). The reformed Constitution 
created a new Interpol which is characterized by three fundamental principles namely, respect 
for national sovereignty, imposition of ordinary criminal law and universality (Yapsan, 2012). 
In addition, Article 3 was added to effectively rebuilt the neutral character of the organization 
by stating: "It is strictly forbidden for the Organisation to undertake any intervention or 
activities of political, military religious or racial character" (Interpol Constitution, 1956). 
Nowadays, Interpol is recognized as an intergovernmental organization, which ‘ensures and 
promotes the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within 
the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Interpol Constitution, Article 2). 
The reason Interpol can be a major player and work effectively in the field of 
international police cooperation, is its neutral character that safeguards the relations between 
its member states. As highlighted before, according to Deflem’s (2000) theory on 
international police cooperation, organizations such as Interpol can only come into being and 
17 
 
foster cooperation once detached from political and power of states. The organization’s 
neutral nature became increasingly important after the Second World War, with Cold War 
tension making international police cooperation a difficult field to operate in. Interpol placed 
high value on their neutrality and non-political nature to avoid its practices becoming an 
intrusion on the political sovereignty of its members and to safeguard effective relationships 
(Mallika, 2007). By keeping clear from any controversial cases involving political, religious, 
racial or military matter Interpol was able to assure its members of its neutrality and thus 
encourage more efficient cooperation. Especially the added Article 3 made sure that Interpol 
was unable to give preference to any member state, group or person with a diverging agenda, 
and solely focus on combatting international crime. This political neutrality was thus essential 
for the effectiveness of Interpol’s practices (Rene, 2012). In its decision-making, Interpol was 
now often constrained by this article and its relationship to its members by staying away from 
any cases that could harm a nation’s sovereignty and betray their faith in a neutral 
organization that safeguards their information.  
 
The decision-making process 
Interpol’s foundations of political neutrality to safeguard efficient cooperation and respect for 
state sovereignty seem important factors in their decision-making process. To see how 
Interpol comes to certain decisions and how they have been able to alter their practices by 
including counterterrorism over the years, it is important to lay out the way the organization is 
set up and what implications this has for the organizational change to come.  
Various scholars have described Interpol’s structure as unconventional, remarkable 
and flexible (Stalcup, 2013; Ling, 2010; Mallika, 2007; Fijaut, 1992). As mentioned, the 
organization is not based on an international treaty, on the contrary its formative body was 
naturally agreed upon by the founding countries and a following General Assembly came up 
18 
 
with its Constitution (Fijaut 1992; Schneider, 2008). Where the organization was first limited 
to the mere exchange of messages concerning police data, the technological developments as 
of 1980 boosted its capabilities. Whilst considering state perceptions of cross-border 
cooperation and the globalization of crime, Interpol has been able to remain a stable structure 
over time and fulfil its obligations and practices to the international community on which the 
organization is built (Ling, 2010). 
The working activities of Interpol are guided within a clear framework of governing 
bodies and statutory meetings. Their structure is characterized by three elements that form the 
decision-making process within the organization, namely an Executive Committee, a General 
Assembly and a General Secretariat (Interpol, n.d.). The General Assembly is Interpol’s main 
supreme governing body which meets every year in a member country to debate and decide 
on issues concerning policies, activities, finances of the organization, programmes etc. All of 
Interpol’s members are represented by a delegation entitled with a single vote. Decisions are 
then simply taken by a majority of votes on a presented Resolution that leads to policy 
formation (Fooner, 1989). The General Assembly within Interpol is a sovereign body of this 
international organization. However, it does not have any legislative power over the police 
bodies of its member countries. The purpose of the General Assembly, and with that the 
decisions as a result of it, are mere recommendations and suggestions that are aimed to be 
implemented in their member countries. This governing body of Interpol provides a platform 
for discussion of relevant topics to international police cooperation and serves as the basis for 
information exchange, shared knowledge and mutual trust between the countries involved 
(Fooner, 1989). The Executive Committee is the executive organ of Interpol. Its 13 members 
are elected during the General Assembly and led by the President of the Organization. The 
main task or this body is to guide the organization in its practices and manage the 
implementation of decisions resulting from the General Assembly (Interpol, n.d.). The daily 
19 
 
implementation and administration practices of Interpol is found within the General 
Secretariat, led by the Secretary-General. The office and thus the heart of the organization is 
based in Lyon France as of 1956. Noteworthy is that this component of Interpol operates 24 
hours a day, 365 days a year (Interpol, n.d.). Because it functions as the centre of contact for 
national and international authorities, the General Secretariat is what keeps the organization 
going (Mallika, 2007).  
Apart from the three elements that outline how decisions are made within Interpol, the 
organization distinguishes itself by their set-up of their NCBs, National Central Bureaus. To 
ensure international police cooperation, Interpol requires its members to participate, within 
their power and to the extent that the legislation of their country allows, to the practices and 
activities of the organization (Interpol Constitution, Article 31). The NCBs are the lifeblood 
of Interpol, by contributing information to the criminal databased and fostering cooperation 
across borders during international investigations (Fooner, 1989). This link of national police 
forces with Interpol’s global network, all regions of the world are working together to 
combine their knowledge, expertise and resources in fighting international crime.  
 The baseline conditions under which Interpol thus functions can be summarized as a) 
high respect for nations sovereignty, b) the avoidance of cases with a political, religious, 
racial or military character, and c) through a decision-making process guided by General 
Assemblies which only task is to advise their members but does not have any impact or 
executive power. However, as the next sections will show, these conditions will be altered as 
a result of the following crises. 
 
Crisis 
Over the course of history Interpol has struggled with cases revolving around political matters 
and especially in terms of combatting terrorism. Even though the organization is guided by 
the principle of non-interference in political mattes, they have been able to change their 
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course of action and get involved in counterterrorism efforts. The following events have 
confronted Interpol with its inability to act and sparked crisis situations to the organization 
and its member states. The first major issue that Interpol faced, occurred in 1951 when an 
aircraft from Czechoslovakia was hijacked and ended up on an American airbase in West 
Germany (Stalcup, 2013). This matter appealed to Interpol’s political neutrality since two 
member-states argued against each other. Czechoslovakia called for Interpol’s famous ‘red 
notices’ to capture the perpetrators of this act of piracy, where on the other hand the US urged 
Interpol to stay out of the investigation. Since the US interpreted this act as refugees from a 
communist regime seeking political asylum, this matter was argued political and thus outside 
of Interpol’s activities. Surprisingly, going against their own restrictions, Interpol chose the 
side of the Czech government leading the walkout of the FBI and the US withdrawing their 
membership from the organization (Rene, 2012). The ambiguous nature and possible 
interpretations of Article 3 proved problematic in this situation as two countries played out 
their political cards, leading to severe consequences. This event sparked a higher importance 
to the non-political nature of the organization, but it is not considered leading to a critical 
juncture. This shocking event did not open a realm of decision-making for the organization 
nor did it set the organization on a path-dependent process. On the contrary, in years to follow 
their position on terrorism remained ambiguous. 
A second major controversy occurred during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich 
where Israeli athletes were shot in the Olympic village. The German police immediately 
requested information on the terrorists and urged Interpol to track down the perpetrators. 
However, this time Interpol did stay true to its neutral position and refused to get involved in 
a case that fell within the restrictions of Article 3 due to its high political motivation (Bresler, 
1992).  Response from former Secretary-General Nepoté sounded: “We found ourselves with 
some extremely difficult decisions on our hands because terrorism is not defined anywhere. 
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There is no code ... no definition which tells you which people are terrorists and which are 
non-political terrorists committing ordinary law crimes" (Bresler, 1992, p.148). This second 
controversial event showed the difficulty of defining a terrorist act or even defining what falls 
under activities with a political, military, religious or racial character. Even though the need to 
act was present, this time around the organization stayed true to its principles. 
After these attacks Interpol was lucky not to have to deal with other difficult cases for 
a while, but the ambiguity and confusion surrounding their role involving terrorism was 
clearly demonstrated. Their inconsequent decisions and rising tensions with member states 
because of it, showed that their foundations did not provide them with a distinct recipe on 
dealing with terrorism. The need for international police cooperation between nations was 
growing and this event led to a willingness of states to tighten their bonds to ensure safety to 
the international community. The increase in international violence over the next years led to 
members from Western Europe and even the United States to urge Interpol to assist them in 
their counterterrorism efforts. During this time, it seems that the assistance that Interpol was 
able to provide in the area of counterterrorism, was valued over the member states’ tight 
control of discovery and use of valuable information (Schneider, 2009). This external pressure 
resulting from the Munich attacks triggered a debate inside Interpol regarding the 
interpretation of the term ‘political’ and what cases were characterized and thus prohibited 
due to the restrictions of Article 3 (Barnett & Coleman, 2005). 
 
Critical Juncture 
This research argues that after the attacks in Munich in 1972 the need for international police 
cooperation by members states and their dissatisfaction of Interpol’s ability led to a period of 
critical juncture, in which the organization expanded the interpretation of their political nature 
by altering Article 3 in the Constitution, leading to a path dependent process which set them 
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on a course to gradually include counterterrorism activities. Table 1. provides an overview of 
all the elements of the critical juncture framework needed to assess this case. 
Table 1. Expansion of Article 3 as a Critical Juncture  
Antecedent condition Strong non-political interference based in 
“Article 3” 
Cleavage (permissive condition) Growing fear of terrorist attacks  
(Munich 1972)  
Productive condition Need for further assistance by member 
states 
Mechanisms of reproduction Resolutions on counterterrorism 
Legacy (outcome) Incorporation of counterterrorism activities 
Constant cause (alternative explanations) Strong non-interference of political, racial, 
religious, military cases 
 
After the attack in Munich, the need for further international police cooperation amongst the 
international community and with that, Interpol’s member states grew stronger. Along with 
that the dissatisfaction of Interpol’s ability to handle these cases and their refusal to get 
involved, member states urged for something to be done, unwary of the costs to their 
sovereignty (Interpol, 1979; Interpol, 1983). During this time a set of guidelines revolving the 
handling of terrorism had been drawn up by Interpol’s General Secretariat. However, due to 
the sensitivity of the subject matter they were not addressed until 1983. After previous 
Secretary-General John Nepoté, a strong believer in the non-political nature of Interpol, 
retired in 1978 the complaints on Interpol’s inability to deal with certain cases, especially on 
terrorism, came to light (Mallika, 2007). During the General Assemblies of the next years, 
Interpol’s inabilities and outdated Constitution were a noted subject. Pressing matters on 
increasing international crime were frequently brought up at General Assemblies by member 
states. As a result, during the opening of the 52nd General Assembly in Cannes, the 
organization’s President, Bugarin addressed his plans to update the organization’s course of 
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action and need to fulfil present day requirements. He also acknowledged the need for a 
critical review of previous actions and the will to prove Interpol’s ability to deal with the 
complexities of present times (Interpol, 1983). With the increasing concern of terrorism 
affecting the organization and its members, as well as aftermath of the inadequate response to 
the Munich attacks, Interpol was now faced alternative options to address this issue and alter 
the organization’s stance on the matter, leading to the decision to revaluate the Interpol’s 
Constitution (Interpol, 1984). During the 53rd General Assembly the Executive Committee 
proposed the following resolution, Resolution No AGN/53/RES/7 - Application of Article 3 
of the Constitution which was passed with 70 votes in favour, 17 against and 3 abstentions 
(Interpol, 1984a). 
The Application of Article 3 of the Constitution was a highly controversial event, of 
which its impact set the course of Interpol’s actions on a completely different path.  The rising 
concern of terrorism after the Munich attacks led to a study conducted on the role of Interpol 
in counterterrorism bearing in mind the provisions of Article 3, plus a symposium to gather 
intel and expertise on how to deal with international crimes of this scale (INTERPOL, 1983a). 
As a result, the resolution of the Application of Article 3 of the Constitution came into being 
(INTERPOL, 1984a). This resolution clearly redefined Article 3 respecting its limits but 
acknowledging the ambiguity of the definition of political, racial, religious and military 
practices. Each case posed by a member state should therefore be taken into consideration 
separately whilst looking at the context, also placing full responsibility with the member state 
requesting Interpol’s help. This is often referred to as the theory of predominance highlighting 
the criminal character of a terrorist attack over the political motives. By doing this, Article 3 
could be avoided, and the crime was treated only for what it in core principle was (Gottlieb, 
2011). This was mainly done by looking at the connection between the motives of the terrorist 
and the relationship to the victims. Three criteria were developed to evaluate terrorist cases. 
24 
 
The first “Doctrine of Conflict Area” proclaims that any terrorist act committed outside of the 
conflict area, would be seen as predominantly criminal even with clear political motives 
(Sheptycki, 2004, p.131). Secondly, the status of the victims was assessed and posed that no 
innocent civilian can ever be a legitimate target of a terrorist attack, no matter the motivation 
behind it. Such crimes are then again treated as predominantly criminal. Lastly, the scale of 
the crime was considered, arguing that crimes exceeding a certain level of violence could not 
be a legitimate expression of grievances. Such brutal attacks are then classified as 
predominantly criminal (Gottlieb, 2011). Acts that now fall under the scope of Article 3 
include acts that by very nature are political such as treason, membership of prohibited 
organization and acts committed by politicians in connection to their political activities. 
However, when the act itself is not politically loaded it falls outside the scope of Article 3 
such as, acts by persons with political motives but without connections to those motives, or 
offences committed outside of the conflict area for example hijackings, hostages and 
kidnapping (Interpol, 1984a). Overall, if the victims of the crime are not connected to the 
objectives of the perpetrators, the country of conflict or political position, the crime fall 
outside the scope of Article 3 and Interpol can get involved. 
This resolution changed the limited scope under which the General Secretariat and the 
NCBs operate. As mentioned the effectiveness and autonomy that comes from Interpol’s 
structure is based on the two-sided notion of respect for state sovereignty that leads to 
voluntary collaboration between police forces across borders, and the governance structure 
that safeguards the organization’s own independence by operating through NCBs (Schneider, 
2008). The event outlined above, illustrates that the increase and evolvement of international 
crime set in motion a discussion within Interpol as well as pressing urgency to act by its 
members. Their need for Interpol to address cases which are controversial in nature led them 
to loosen their apprehensions and allow for Interpol to expand its range of activities. With the 
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alteration of Article 3, the Secretary-General is now able to discuss the potential application 
of Article 3 to specific cases with the requesting NCB. This places full responsibility on the 
requesting country once they decide to carry out an investigation. This clear definition of the 
cases Interpol can and cannot get involved with, plus the insurance of passing over 
responsibility to the requesting country has altered the conditions under which Interpol now 
operates. After the crisis Interpol thus entered a period of critical juncture which gave them 
the option to remain on the unclear path they were confronted with in the previous years but 
with respect for state sovereignty or take advantage of the loosing constraints of member 
states and change their stance on counterterrorism. The next section will explain the path-
dependent process leading of this alteration to the Constitution. 
 
Legacy 
It has become clear that the application of Article 3 and its previous interpretation, was not in line 
with the foundations on which Interpol was built on, especially concerning counterterrorism 
efforts. The next central question is to what degree did the event of altering this part of the 
Constitution set Interpol on a different, dependent path. In order to argue that it was a period of 
critical juncture that caused Interpol to change from a non-political IO into a leading organization 
in counterterrorism, the criticalness of this juncture which lies in its legacy, must be assessed.  
The outcome of the alteration of Article 3 led Interpol to being able to expand their 
activities concerning counterterrorism which under other circumstances without member 
states recognition would not have been permitted as shown in previous cases. The path-
dependent process Interpol found itself on can be defined by the many resolutions passed in 
the years to come after the alteration to the Constitution. The first addressed the classification 
of terrorist crimes: Resolution No AGN/53/RES/6 - Violent Crime Commonly Referred to as 
Terrorism. This resolution defined the term terrorism and surpassed the norm of national 
sovereignty by placing the emphasis on the scope of terrorism, affecting all member states, 
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thus making it of the essence to every party involved. This resolution was adopted with an 
overwhelming outcome in favour, with 95 votes for, and 1 abstention (GA 1984). The impact 
of the amended Article 3 is clearly visible by the following statement by Secretary-General 
Kendall about the new classification of terrorism: "We were only able to act in a rather 
discreet and hypocritical kind of manner. When there was, for instance, a serious bomb 
incident ... we would not call it terrorism. That word was banned from our dictionary ... we 
called it violent crime by organised groups" (Bresler, 1992, p.153). The new path Interpol 
was now set on was developed even further during the General Assembly in Washington 
where a manual was formed to advise the NCBs on how to cooperate and deal with terrorism, 
as well as placing the item International Terrorism on the agenda of all next General 
Assemblies, Executive Committee meetings and Regional Conferences (INTERPOL, 1985). 
The notion of terrorism being a global international problem directed against the entire 
international community remained a concern and the need to finding out the best way to carry 
out the complex and humane mission of Interpol within these limits was a key point on the 
agenda (INTERPOL, 1986). In 1993 fighting terrorism is stated to be one of the main tasks 
for international police cooperation (INTERPOL, 1993). Concluding from the General 
Assembly of 1993 is an evaluation of Interpol’s strategy and determination to combat 
terrorism. The “New Guidelines for Combatting International Terrorism” are presented 5 
years later (INTERPOL, 1998a). Where the adjustments of Article 3 were built on the theory 
of predominance by looking at the circumstances and nature of the crime before the motives, 
the new guidelines are directly aimed at improving cooperation and strongly condemn any 
terrorist acts. An important consequence being the ‘Declaration Against Terrorism’ posed by 
Interpol and passed by its member states. This declaration still offers no clear definition of 
terrorism but condemns all terrorist acts that threaten the international community and fall 
under the descriptions of past resolutions. Apart from that Interpol will now take on the task 
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of organizing an international conference on combatting terrorism under the UN, strive for an 
international action plan, and urge all fellow organizations to show international solidarity 
towards the fight against terrorism (INTERPOL, 1998b). This declaration turned Interpol’s 
activities surrounding terrorism from, fitting cases intro their cooperation and information 
practices, to active participation in combatting international terrorism. A year later in 1999 the 
role of Interpol as an essential instrument for international police cooperation aimed at 
achieving the objectives of the draft United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime was noted in AGN-1999-RES-8 – The role of Interpol (INTERPOL, 1999).  
Leading up to 2001 counterterrorism thus seemed to turn into a permanent part of the 
practices and aims of Interpol. However, as of 11 September 2001 their priorities shifted 
further towards counterterrorism with a high acceleration. The tragic events of 9/11 led to an 
implementation of a 24-hour service of Interpol’s Headquarters, a boost in communication 
with the public, a Crisis Task Force and a special Resolution AGN-2001-RES-5 – 9/11 
(INTERPOL, 2001). This resolution called for enhanced cooperation against organized crime, 
higher priority of red notices for the perpetrations of this act and “SOLEMNLY PLEDGES 
that the Organization and each of its Members endorsing the present resolution will 
collaborate without reservation, to the fullest extent permitted by law, in identifying every 
individual who assisted in committing these acts and bringing those who were responsible for 
them to justice.” (INTERPOL, 2001).  
It has thus become clear that the amendment of Article 3 has set Interpol on a course, 
abandoning their non-political nature to the point where their efforts to separate crime from 
motive were surpassed by the need to protect humanity. The build up of more and more 
resolutions defining further the role of the organization in counterterrorism activities could 
only have taken place in the light of the newly interpreted Article 3. This path-dependent 
process characterized by a long period of stable understanding of Interpol’s duty to its 
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members and foster international police cooperation in an environment of growing 
international crime has turned Interpol into a leading organization in counterterrorism, with 
actual operational capabilities.  
 
Constant cause 
This research argues that it was a period of critical juncture that set Interpol on a divergent 
path, changing from an IO concerned about its non-political nature to foster effective 
international police cooperation, to a leading organization in counterterrorism. To illustrate 
that it was the loosening constraints of member states that led to the alteration of the 
Constitution, this research argues with the help of alternative explanations, that this could not 
have occurred under different circumstances. In the hypothetical case where member states 
had acted during the 1972 Munich attacks as they did during the 1951 crisis of the Czech 
hijackings, Interpol’s course would not have altered or become path-dependent.  
 The example of the Czech hijacking as illustrated as a possible crisis above, shows 
that members of Interpol criticized the decision to get involved in a ‘political’ crime, as well 
as the ambiguity of the interpretation of such cases. Their resistance to Interpol’s involvement 
in this political issue shows that they did not place international safety above state issues. If 
after the Munich attacks member states did not feel the need for further cooperation, the 
possibility for Interpol to redefine the scope of their activities would have been highly 
contested. Under the constant causes of respect for state sovereignty, avoidance of political, 
religious, racial or military character as stated in Article 3 and only advisory power, the 
possibility to alter the Constitution and expand their activities would not have occurred. 
Against these baseline conditions Interpol’s Executive Committee would not have been able 
to pose the change the course of action. Only as a result of a crisis in a period of critical 
juncture could the organization have resulted in a path dependent process. A second factor to 
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highlight the critical juncture argument is the legacy as illustrated above. This process is 
argued path dependent as the implication of the critical juncture is a narrowing of the range of 
options making it more difficult to return to the original pattern of action (Schreyogg & 
Sydow, 2011). If after the Munich attacks Article 3 would not have been reinterpreted, its 
nature would stay ambiguous and the application doubtful. This would thus not send the 
organization in a path-dependent phase which limits their options but remain open to 
interpretation and selective in application whenever the next controversial case presented 
itself. However, as illustrated above due to the implications of the amended Article 3 Interpol 
was set on a path the more specifically defined their role in the field of counterterrorism up to 
the point where they became a leading player in the field, able to act effectively after 9/11.  
 
Conclusion 
This research has laid out the trajectory that Interpol has gone through concerning the step by step 
integration of counterterrorism effort in their practices. This research has argued that it was a 
period of critical juncture leading off the growing threat of terrorism, that allowed Interpol to alter 
their mandate and set them on a path-dependent course with a focus on counterterrorism. Because 
of the necessity by member states for international police cooperation, the structural constraints of 
Interpol’s non-political nature were loosened in this period and allowed them to alter their view 
and interpretation of terrorism. By laying out the foundations of the organization the 
understanding of the value of its unpolitical nature has become clear. It demonstrates the 
contingency of their actions to go against their original mandate and include counterterrorism 
practices in their activities. The analysis of the aftermath of the Munich Olympic attacks has 
shown that the inability of Interpol to act has led member states to call for more serious measures 
and allow a breach to their sovereignty. It was this opening up of options for Interpol to evolve in 
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the field of counterterrorism that set them on a path to expand their activities, which up to date 
have turned them into one of the leading agencies in this field.  
The fact that Interpol has been able to balance its own autonomy and the sovereignty of its 
members is an interesting observation. Especially in the field of international police cooperation, 
which deals with highly confidential information, it is remarkable that this organization has 
gradually been able to push its power over its members. It seems that in cases such as terrorism, 
which threaten the entire international community, that states are more willing to give up their 
sovereignty to IOs, in order to fight international crime more effectively. This opens up new 
perspectives on the role of IOs in relation to states. This finding helps argue in favour of the 
importance of IOs in the international community. If states are willing to give up their sovereignty 
under certain circumstances and allow IOs to take on more tasks, it would be interesting to see 
how the importance of the cause stands in relation to the amount of power given to an IO. 
Interpol’s defiance of state power is not the only interesting observation in this case. The puzzling 
issue of an organization altering one of its fundamental principles serves as a clear demonstration 
of how far organizational change can go. Further research should look into the legitimacy of such 
changes and how this implicates the perception of the future practices of an organization. Interpol 
does not seem to be questioned on its ability to act as a leading agency in counterterrorism, but the 
controversial nature of its activities could have implications on how reliable the organization is 
perceived. 
This research as shown that a period of critical juncture has opened up the possibility for 
organizations to change their course of actions. However, the analysis of the agency of decision-
making actors is limited and has not been fully taken into account. The analysis has shown that a 
switch in the organization’s Secretary General, after the leave of John Nepoté, has also played a 
part in the transformation that Interpol has gone through. Further research on this topic should 
take into account the agency attributed to these actors but also perhaps their personality, opinions 
and leadership style. 
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Overall, this research has aimed to unravel the case of Interpol’s transformation from a 
‘non-political’ IO into a leading player in the field of counterterrorism. It has clearly become 
visible that Interpol was presented with path altering opportunities during a period of critical 
juncture which have led them to expand their effort. To conclude, Interpol has grown into 
becoming an influential organization that sees terrorism as a clear threat to public safety, national 
security and international stability, and recognized the prevention of such crimes as the highest 
priority (INTERPOL, 2017). 
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